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ANTITRUST-ILLINOIS BRICK RULE REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF PRIVATE
ANTITRUST ACTION BY INDIRECT PURCHASERS DESPITE
ALLEGATION OF INJURY AS DIRECT TARGET OF
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSPIRACY
Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1983)
Caterpillar Tractor Company, a large manufacturer of industrial and
farm equipment,' utilizes a worldwide network of authorized Caterpillar
dealers to promote, distribute, install, and service its retail products. 2 Ac-
cording to the Distribution Agreement in effect in 1978, Caterpillar sold
electric generator sets3 to authorized dealers at a discount of 25%. 4 Five
percent, or one fifth of this discount, represented compensation for the
dealer's obligation to provide free delivery, inspection and warranty services
to purchasers of new generator sets. 5 Under the Distribution Agreement, the
selling dealer was required to return the five percent service fee to Caterpil-
lar if the generator was moved or resold elsewhere and another dealer pro-
vided the bulk of these services. 6 Caterpillar would then transfer the five
percent service fee to the servicing dealer upon the filing of an appropriate
claim for reimbursement. 7 If no claim was made by a servicing dealer
within one year of the sale, Caterpillar's practice was to return the fee to the
selling dealer.8 If an authorized Caterpillar dealer sold generator sets to an
1. 1 STANDARD & POOR'S REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS, DIRECTORS AND Ex-
ECUTIVEs 457 (1983).
2. Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 960 (1983), cerl. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984).
3. A typical generator set consists of a diesel engine, a generator, a battery, a
governor, and transfer switches. Id. at 960 n.l. "It is used to provide 'prime' power
to buildings and clusters of buildings without access to central power sources and to
provide 'standby' powers to hospitals, schools, or other buildings." Id.
4. Id. at 960. Each Distribution Agreement assigns a Caterpillar dealer an area
of service responsibility. d. The dealer agrees to maintain a place of business in that
area, to market Caterpillar products there, and to service Caterpillar products which
are used within his territory. Id. The Distribution Agreement requires each dealer
"to provide, free of charge to the user, delivery, inspection, and warranty services
with respect to all Caterpillar products that receive their 'initial substantial use' in
that dealer's service territory, regardless of when, where, or by whom the product
may have been sold." Id.
5. Id. This compensation was for the dealer's provision of these services on gen-
erators sold by the dealer and used within his territory. Id.
6. Id. If a generator set was sold in one dealer's territory and taken to another
territory for the period of its "initial substantial use," the selling dealer was required
to return the five percent service fee to Caterpillar. Id. In this event, the selling
dealer received a 20% discount. Id.
7. Id. This practice was required by the Distribution Agreement. Id.
8. Id. The court did not indicate whether this practice was required under the
Distribution Agreement. Id. Prior to 1978, many dealers transferred the service fee
directly to the servicing dealers. Id. at 960 n.2. In July of 1978, Caterpillar insisted
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independent marketer for resale outside the Caterpillar dealer's service terri-
tory, and the independent marketer provided full warranty service, no claim
would be made for the service fee. 9 Accordingly, an authorized Caterpillar
dealer could offer generator sets to these independent marketers at reduced
prices, knowing that Caterpillar would remit the service fee to its selling
dealer after one year. 10
In July of 1978, Caterpillar begin to retain unclaimed service fees in-
stead of returning them to the selling dealers.' I In response, the authorized
dealers offered the generator sets to independent marketers at a smaller
discount. 12
In the mid-70's, plaintiffs, a group of general trading companies,13 be-
gan purchasing Caterpillar generator sets in the United States for resale in
the international market.' 4 Once the generators were resold abroad, plain-
tiffs provided all warranty services to the purchasers. 5 In 1980, plaintiffs
brought a private antitrust action under sections 416 and 1617 of the Clayton
Act, 18 alleging that Caterpillar's policy of retaining unclaimed service fees
was adopted in furtherance of a conspiracy between Caterpillar and its au-
that the dealers comply with the terms of the Agreement and remit the fees to Cater-
pillar. Id.
9. Id. at 960-61. If an authorized dealer sold to an independent marketer for
resale outside the dealer's territory, the dealer would return 5% to Caterpillar. Id.
No authorized dealers would provide warranty service or file claims for the fee with
Caterpillar if the independent marketer provided full warranty service. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 961. Caterpillar classified the unclaimed service fees as miscellaneous
income. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 961. Plaintiffs were engaged in the international marketing and serv-
icing of numerous products. Id.
14. Id. The plaintiff trading companies purchased generator sets primarily from
Ohio Machinery Company (OMCO), a Caterpillar-authorized dealer in Cleveland,
Ohio. M. Plaintiffs then resold the generators on the international market, in compe-
tition with Caterpillar-authorized dealers in Europe and the Middle East. Id.
15. Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a treble dam-
age remedy for victims of antitrust violations:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id For a discussion of the enactment and current application of § 4, see notes 29-32
and accompanying text bifra.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides, in pertinent
part: "Any person, firm, corporation or association shall be entitled to sue and have
injunctive relief. . . as against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws." Id (emphasis added). For a discussion of the distinct policies supporting the
§ 4 and § 16 remedies, see notes 80-85 and accompanying text infra.
18. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-27
(1982)).
[Vol. 29: p. 801
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thorized dealer in Saudi Arabia in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 19 The plaintiffs claimed that the conspiracy was designed "to allocate
customers and territories for the sale of Caterpillar electric generator sets and
to foreclose [the plaintiffs] and other generator set marketers from engaging
in price competition with defendant's authorized dealers."'20
Caterpillar filed a motion to dismiss the section 4 claim, claiming that
section 4 did not provide a remedy to persons who were not direct purchasers
from an alleged antitrust violator. 2' The district court denied the motion,
holding that indirect purchasers could assert a treble damages action under
section 4 when they were the direct targets of an unlawful conspiracy. 2 2 The
19. 713 F.2d at 961 (citing Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). Section 1 of
the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination ...or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Plaintiffs alleged that Caterpillar's motivation in changing its service fee policy
was to eliminate plaintiffs' competition in selling generator sets in Saudi Arabia. 713
F.2d at 961. Plaintiffs characterized the new fee policy as placing an "automatic
penalty" on dealers who sold generator sets for use outside their territory. Id.
20. 713 F.2d at 961 (quoting Complaint of Plaintiff at 21). Plaintiffs claimed
to have lost sales, profits, and new business opportunities as a result of Caterpillar's
actions. Id
[Plaintiffs] also allege that prices of electric generator sets have been artifi-
cially stabilized and maintained, that competition in the sale of the genera-
tor sets has been substantially lessened or eliminated, that Caterpillar's
authorized dealers have been prevented from distributing generator sets in
territories and to customers of their choosing, and that purchasers of the
generator sets have been deprived of the opportunity to purchase those
products from suppliers of their own choice at competitive prices.
Id
21. Id. at 962. Caterpillar argued in its motion to dismiss that suits by indirect
purchasers alleging "passed-on" damages were precluded by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 713 F.2d at 962 (citing Ilhois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746). For
a discussion of Illinois Brick, see notes 42-52 and accompanying text infta. For a dis-
cussion of "pass-on" theory, see note 33 and accompanying text ifra. The defendant
conceded that Ilh'noz Brick would not bar the plaintiffs from seeking injunctive relief
under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). 713 F.2d at 962 n.6. For a
discussion of llhois Brick's applicability to injunctive relief under the Clayton Act,
see notes 80-85 and accompanying text infra.
22. 713 F.2d at 962. The district court did not perceive Illhois Brick as an abso-
lute bar to suits by indirect purchasers under § 4, and felt that a later Supreme Court
decision mandated a more flexible approach. Id. (citing Appellee's Brief at 4511 (cit-
ing Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982))). For a discussion of Blue Shield,
see notes 86-93 and accompanying text infra.
After the district court denied the defendant's motion, it entered an amended
order denying the motion and certifying a controlling question of law for immediate
appeal. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982)). The following question was certified
by the district court:
When an alleged conspiracy between an electrical generator manufacturer
and one of its authorized foreign dealers is formed to hinder and/or exclude
intra-brand competition in the foreign market by an independent, non-fac-
tory authorized dealer who purchases from other authorized dealers for re-
sale in the foreign market, whereby the manufacturer imposes a non-
refundable "5% warranty service fee" on all sales by authorized dealers
when the generators are to be installed for initial use outside of the author-
1983-84]
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 23 reversed, holding that,
regardless of their claim that they were the targets of a conspiracy, indirect
purchasers are not entitled to recover damages for antitrust injuries under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d
958 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984).
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189024 and the Clayton
Act of 191425 in order to promote competition and inhibit monopolies and
restraints upon freedom of trade.26 The Sherman Act is a broad prohibition
of anticompetitive practices27 which Congress believed resulted in the en-
hancement of prices and inefficient allocation of resources.28 Section 4 of the
ized selling dealer's assigned geographical service territory, is the "target-
victim" of the conspiracy (the independent non-factory authorized dealer)
precluded from maintaining a private damage action against the manufac-
turer under Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15) by operation of
the rule of Ilzthois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52
L.Ed.2d 707 (1977)?
Id. at 962 n.7.
23. 713 F.2d at 960. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Hunter and Higgin-
botham and District Judge Gerry of the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey, sitting by designation. Judge Hunter wrote the majority opinion.
Judge Higginbotham filed a dissenting opinion.
24. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
25. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1982)).
26. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 1, at 14 (1977).
Congress believed the Sherman Act was
required by the economic condition of the times, that is, the vast accumula-
tion of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous
development of corporate organization, the facility for combination which
such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility was being used, and
that combinations known as trusts were being multiplied, and the wide-
spread impression that their power had been and would be exerted to op-
press individuals and injure the public generally.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits con-
tracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). For
the pertinent text of § 1, see note 19 supra. Section 2 prohibits monopolization, at-
tempts to monopolize, and combinations and conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1982). For a general discussion of the Sherman Act, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note
26, §§ 49-52, 59, at 132-40, 152-55.
28. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). The Court noted
that the fear of price enhancement and other wrongs
led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition or treating as illegal all
contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive condi-
tions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act or where the
surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that they
had not been entered into or performed with the legitimate purpose of rea-
sonably forwarding personal interest and developing trade, but on the con-
trary were of such a character as to give rise to the inference or presumption
that they had been entered into or done with the intent to do wrong to the
general public and to limit the right of individuals, thus restraining the free
flow of commerce and tending to bring about the evils, such as enhance-
ment of prices, which were considered to be against public policy.
[Vol. 29: p. 801
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Clayton Act (section 4) encourages the prosecution of antitrust actions by
"private attorneys general" 29 by authorizing a treble damage remedy for
"[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
30
Despite the very broad language of section 4, federal courts have recog-
nized that Congress intended to limit the availability of relief under the sec-
tion.31 The Supreme Court has attempted to define these limits in a manner
which is consistent with the legislative purposes of the antitrust laws: com-
pensating victims of anticompetitive conduct and depriving violators of their
Id. Eventually, the focus of the Sherman Act shifted from the control of price en-
hancement to the preservation of allocative efficiency. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 26, § 1, at 1-2. For a discussion of the origin and purposes of the Sherman Act,
see generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 49-62.
29. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). For a discussion of
this case, see note 52 infra.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The critical language of § 4 of the Clayton Act was
originally enacted as § 7 of the Sherman Act. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 904 (1983) (citing Sherman
Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982))). The
original provision, which permitted only recovery of the actual enhancement of price,
was subsequently changed to provide treble damages in order to provide small con-
sumers with an adequate incentive to bring suit. See 21 CONG. REC. 1765, 2455, 3145
(1890). For the pertinent text of § 4, see note 16 supra.
31. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970)
(requirement in § 4 of the Clayton Act that suit be based on injuries which occur "by
reason of" antitrust violations expressly restricts the right to sue under the section to
plaintiffs who have been injured by an antitrust violation that was a "material cause"
in the occurrence of damage), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Nationwide Auto Ap-
praiser Serv. v. Association of Casualty & Sur. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) (the
creation of a standing requirement of "direct" injury under § 4 of Clayton Act must
be assumed to be in accord with congressional intent); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962) (plaintiff must prove that his injury
was proximately caused by the alleged antitrust violation in order to recover under
§ 4 of the Clayton Act).
The Supreme Court has fashioned two types of limitations on the § 4 remedy.
See Blue Shield v. McCready, 257 U.S. 465 (1982). The first type of limitation re-
stricts the classes ofplathtffi who may recover treble damages for antitrust violations.
See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251 (1972). In Itawativ. Standard Oil Co., the Court ruled that § 4 did not permit
a state to sue in its parens patriae capacity for damages to its general economy. 405
U.S. at 263-64. The Court created this limitation to avoid "the problem of double
recovery inherent in allowing damages for harm both to the economic interests of
individuals and for the quasi-sovereign interests of the state." Id. at 264. In llinois
Brick, the Court applied this same policy rationale to suits by indirect purchasers
against antitrust violators. 431 U.S. at 736-48. For a discussion of Blue Shield, see
notes 86-93 and accompanying text itfra. For a discussion of Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., see note 52 ihfra. For a discussion of llhnois Brick, see notes 42-55 and accompany-
ing text infra.
The second limitation on § 4 claims is the concept of antitrust standing. See
generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, § 147, at 770. This limitation involves the ques-
tion "of which persons have sustained injuries too remote [from an antitrust viola-
tion] to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4." Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at
746-48 (setting forth relevant analysis and comparing theory of antitrust standing to
proximate cause in negligence).
1983-84]
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illegal gains.32
Private enforcement of the antitrust laws is complicated because the
impact of anticompetitive practices such as overpricing is frequently "passed
on" through the chain of distribution. 33 During the 1950's and 1960's, many
defendants in price fixing and monopolization antitrust suits defended
against section 4 claims by alleging that the plaintiffs had escaped injury by
passing on illegal overcharges to their customers.34 In Hanover Shoe v. Untied
Shoe Machtneg Corp.,35 the Supreme Court rejected the "pass-on" defense,
holding that a direct purchaser could recover for the entire overcharge, even
if he had passed a portion of it down the vertical chain of distribution.
36
The Court reasoned that allowance of such a defense in treble damage ac-
32. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (citations omitted).
33. See Comment, Scahng the Illinois Brtck Wall The Future of Indirect Purchasers in
Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 311 (1978). Pass-on theory has been
asserted offensively and defensively by antitrust litigants. See 1d. at 312. "Defendant
sellers have argued that direct purchaser plaintiffs sustained no injury because they
passed on overcharges to the next level in the chain of distribution ....... Id. See
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (defensive pass-
on theory). For a discussion of Hanover Shoe, see notes 35-39 and accompanying text
infra. The offensive use of pass-on theory is illustrated in suits against remote sellers,
where the plaintiff-indirect purchasers argue that middlemen have passed on
overcharges to them. See Comment, supra, at 312. See also Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977) (offensive pass-on theory). For a discussion of 1/linois Brick, see notes
42-55 and accompanying text infra.
34. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 490 n.8
(1968). The pass-on defense is predicated upon the assertion that the injury resulting
from the anticompetitive behavior of the defendant was "passed on" down the verti-
cal chain of distribution to a person other than the original purchaser. See Comment,
supra note 33, at 311. Because the original purchaser increases the resale price to
cover the illegal overcharge which he paid, the ultimate purchaser actually bears the
impact of the defendant's overcharge. Id. The defense is most persuasive when the
demand for the product is perfectly inelastic, and thus the product can be sold at an
increased price with no effect on the quantity demanded. See generally P. SAMUEL-
SON, ECONOMIcs 357-61 (1980). However, real markets always demonstrate some
sensitivity to price fluctuations. Id. at 361. If demand for a product is relatively
insensitive to changes in price (i.e. price-inelastic), the original purchaser will be able
to pass on a larger portion of the overcharge than when demand for the product is
sensitive to changes in price (i.e. price-elastic). See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES,
ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 147-49 (1974).
Prior to the Hanover Shoe decision, the courts were split as to the viability of the
pass-on defense. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 490 n.8 (citing Miller Motors, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958) (defense available for products
purchased for resale); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.) (defense
available for overcharges for products used to produce plaintiff's goods), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 915 (1955); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.)
(defense available where price-fixing concerns products purchased for resale), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp.
59 (S.D.N.Y.) (defense unavailable to utility overcharged for goods used to produce
electricity for customers), interloc, app. refused, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964)).
35. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
36. Id. at 491-94. Hanover Shoe involved a shoe manufacturer which brought a
private antitrust damage action against a shoe machinery manufacturer'. Id. at 483.
The plaintiff argued that the defendant had monopolized the shoe machinery indus-
try by offering its machines for leasing but not for sale. Id. at 483-84. The defendant
[Vol. 29: p. 801
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tions "would often require additional long and complicated proceedings in-
volving massive evidence and complicated theories."' 37  Furthermore, the
Court noted that the goal of vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust
laws would be impaired by leaving prosecution of these suits to the ultimate
consumers of the product, who had "only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little
interest in attempting a class action."'38 The Court held that unless a special
situation such as a cost-plus contract insulated the direct purchaser from
harm, a defendant could not avoid liability by claiming that the damages
were passed on.
39
Hanover Shoe did not resolve the question of whether pass-on theory
could be used offensively.40 That is, could one who had not purchased di-
attempted to avoid liability by claiming that the plaintiff had passed on the illegal
overcharges to its purchasers. Id. at 491-92.
37. Id. at 493. The Court stated that
[a] wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. . . . [A]
businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been different (a
single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more bouyant, or
the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different
price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than
an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's
price will have on its total sales.
Id.
The Court noted that even if these complex economic calculations could be
made, the fact that the direct purchaser might have increased the price of the prod-
uct to the full extent of the illegal overcharge did not indicate that he had been
undamaged. Id at 493 n.9 ("[t]he possessor of a right can recover for its unlawful
deprivation whether or not he was previously exercising it"). Because the direct pur-
chaser was always free to raise the price of the product and thus increase his profits
on resale, the case would still be burdened with complex apportionment calculations,
even when the plaintiff increased his selling price to the full extent of the overcharge.
Id. at 493.
38. 392 U.S. at 494. The Third Circuit has echoed this sentiment: "[The prohi-
bition of pass-on theory] is predicated in part on the perceived need to concentrate
the recovery in direct purchasers from the defendants so that there be one group with
an incentive to sue and enforce the antitrust laws." Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v.
Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573, 580 n.24 (3d Cir. 1979).
39. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494. The Hanover Shoe Court indicated that there
might be situations where the pass-on defense was valid. Id. The Court gave as an
example the situation where "an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' con-
tract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged." Id. Where both
the cost and the profit are guaranteed to the plaintiff despite the overcharge, the
defendant might be allowed to avoid liability. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, § 252, at
789 (citing Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494). For a discussion of the cost-plus contract
exception in the context of the offensive use of pass-on theory, see notes 54-60 and
accompanying text injra.
40. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977). Despite the Hano-
ver Shoe prohibition of the pass-on defense, the circuits were split as to whether the
offensive use of pass-on theory was authorized. Id. at 728 n.8. See Mangano v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (offensive use
of pass-on theory precluded by Hanover Shoe discussion), affig Philadelphia Hous.
Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa.
1970). But see In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973) (Han-
over Shoe does not require dismissal of suits based on offensive use of pass-on theory),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
1983-84]
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rectly from the antitrust violater (an "indirect" purchaser) maintain a sec-
tion 4 action by claiming that the intermediaries in the chain of distribution
had passed on the defendant's illegal overcharge to it?4 ' This question was
raised in Illinois Brick v. Ilnois,42 where the state of Illinois and 700 govern-
mental units sued a concrete block manufacturer, alleging a price fixing con-
spiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 43 The defendants had
sold concrete blocks to masonry contractors, who incorporated the sales price
in bids submitted to general contractors. The general contractors, in turn,
submitted bids to the plaintiffs.4 4 The Court determined that permitting the
offensive use of pass-on theory would require overruling Hanover Shoe.45
Asymmetrical application of pass-on, the Court reasoned, would present a
serious risk of multiple liability for defendants. 46 Furthermore, the Court
explained that the Hanover Shoe concern regarding litigative burdens was
equally applicable in the context of the offensive use of pass-on theory. 4 7
41. See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726. In the period following Hano-
ver Shoe, many courts, including the Third Circuit, rejected the offensive use of pass-
on theory, reasoning that it involved the same problems of proof considered in Hano-
ver Shoe in the defensive context. For a listing of cases adopting this position, see note
40 supra. But cf. In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(where allegedly price-fixed product passes through various product markets in dif-
ferent forms, plaintiff should be barred from recovery due to difficulty in establishing
causal connection between antitrust violation and price ultimately paid for product;
but where allegedly price-fixed commodity reaches plaintiff in same form that it left
hands of.defendants, plaintiff should be given opportunity to present pass-on evi-
dence). For a critical analysis of the Mfangano approach, see Comment, Mangano and
Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrne, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
394 (1972).
Other courts permitted the offensive use of pass-on theory despite the damage
apportionment problems. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191
(9th Cir. 1973) (allowance of offensive use of pass-on theory furthers enforcement
goal of § 4), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). Despite litigative complexities, these
courts were willing to send pass-on issues to juries. See id. at 201 ("Facts raising rea-
sonable inferences, based upon appropriate market data, should suffice to go to the
jury on [pass-on] questions."); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., [1973-2] Trade Cas.
74,680, at 94,972 (D. Conn. 1973) ("[D]ifficulties of proof or apportionment of dam-
ages are not indubitably insurmountable and should await trial before being
resolved.").
42. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
43. Id. at 726-27. For the relevant portions of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see note
18 supra.
44. 431 U.S. at 726.
45. Id. at 736. For a discussion of why the court determined that permitting
offensive use of pass-on theory would require overruling Hanover Shoe, see notes 46-48
and accompanying text infa.
46. Id. at 731 & n. 11. The Court pointed out that the Hanover Shoe decision
presumed that direct purchasers were entitled to full recovery. Id. at 730. See Hanover
Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489. Therefore, the Court concluded that overlapping recoveries
would result if indirect purchasers were permitted to sue on a pass-on theory. Illinois
Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-31.
47. 431 U.S. at 731-32. The Court noted that Hanover Shoe was principally based
upon "the Court's perception of the uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing price
and output decisions 'in the real economic world rather than an economist's hypo-
thetical model,' . . . and of the costs to the judicial system and the efficient enforce-
[Vol. 29: p. 801
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Therefore, the Court concluded that any rule regarding this theory should
apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants.
48
The Court then considered whether to abandon the rule of Hanover Shoe
and allow both offensive and defensive assertion of pass-on theory.49 The
Court believed that an indirect purchaser-plaintiff's proof of damages would
be based on speculative and complex economic theories which would unduly
burden the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws. 50 A related concern
was that private enforcement of the antitrust laws would be undermined by
diffusing recovery among many remote purchasers who would have little
incentive to sue." The Court concluded that the use of pass-on theory was
generally impermissible and denied recovery to the indirect purchasers.
52
ment of the antitrust laws of attempting to reconstruct those decisions in the
courtroom." Id. (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493) (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 730-32.
49. Id. at 736.
50. Id. at 741-43. The Court noted that
as the Hanover Shoe Court observed, . . . "in the real economic world rather
than an economist's hypothetical model," the latter's drastic simplifications
generally must be abandoned. Overcharged direct purchasers often sell in
imperfectly competitive markets. They often compete with other sellers
that have not been subject to the overcharge; and their pricing policies
often cannot be explained solely by the covenient assumption of profit
maximization.
Id. at 742 (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493) (footnote omitted).
The Court rejected the argument that the use of interpleader and compulsory
joinder could help avoid the problems of duplicative recovery. Id. at 737-41. The
Court stated that "even under the optimistic assumption that joinder of potential
plaintiffs will deal satisfactorily with problems of multiple litigation and liability,"
allowing indirect purchasers to recover using pass-on theories "would transform
treble-damages actions into massive multiparty litigations involving many levels of
distribution and including large classes of ultimate consumers remote from the de-
fendant." Id. at 740.
51. Id. at 745. The Court reasoned that apportionment of the recovery among
plaintiffs up and down the distribution chain would not only increase the overall
costs of recovery by injecting complex issues into the case, but would reduce the
benefits to each plaintiff by dividing the recovery among a larger group. Id.
52. 431 U.S. at 746-48. Perhaps as important as Hanover Shoe in leading to the
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick is Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405
U.S. 251 (1972). The case involved a treble damages action under § 4 brought by the
State of Hawaii on its own behalf and as parens pairae for damages suffered by its
citizens on account of certain alleged antitrust violations. Id. at 253. In concluding
that such a damage action was improper, the Court considered three factors: the
congressional intent to limit § 4 treble damage actions to a small group of plaintiffs;
the risk of duplicative recovery if citizens filed additional suits in their individual
capacities; and the litigative burdens in apportioning damages between the state and
its citizens. Id. at 264.
Congress responded to this decision by passing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act, which states in pertinent part: "Any attorney general of a State
may bring a civil action in the name of such State . . .on behalf of natural persons
residing in such State. . .for injury sustained by such natural persons to their prop-
erty by reason of any violation of Sections 1 to 7 of this title." Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act, § 301, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1982)). The utility of this provision is
1983-84]
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Noting that the policy concerns which prompted the rejection of passed-
on damage claims were not implicated in all cases, the Ilhnois Brick Court
suggested two exceptions to the general prohibition of offensive pass-on the-
ory.53 First, the Court indicated that when an indirect purchaser is commit-
ted to a fixed quantity cost-plus contract with its supplier, the indirect
purchaser should be permitted to entertain a section 4 action against the
remote seller based on an allegation of passed-on overcharges. 54 In this sce-
nario, the plaintiff-indirect purchaser's proof of damages would not involve
speculation regarding the extent to which the direct purchaser transferred its
losses to the plaintiff.
55
Some courts of appeals have interpreted the cost-plus contract excep-
tion narrowly.56 In Mid- West Paper Products v. Continental Group,57 for exam-
ple, the Third Circuit refused to extend the exception to informal cost-plus
pricing arrangements. 5 8 By contrast, in In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litiga-
somewhat weakened by its legislative history, which reveals that the statute creates
no new substantive liability and can be invoked only when the citizens of the state
would have had individual causes of action. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, 9, reprnted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2575, 2578. For a
discussion of state parens patriae actions to enforce the antitrust laws, see Comment,
supra note 33, at 325-27. For a general discussion of the legislative response to lhhois
Brick, see Comment, Congressional Authorik.ation of Indirect Purchaser Treble Damage Clabms:
The Illinois Brick Wall Crumbles, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1979).
53. See Ilhhnoi Bri'ck, 431 U.S. at 735-36 & n.16.
54. Id. at 735-36. The Court noted that under such circumstances, "the pur-
chaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to pass on
the overcharge, because its customer is buying a fixed quantity regardless of price."
Id. at 736.
55. Id. The Court noted that where a cost-plus contract was involved, "[t]he
effect of the overcharge is essentially determined in advance, without reference to the
interaction of supply and demand that complicates the determination in the general
case." Id. In such circumstances, demand is inelastic with respect to price. See R.
POSNER, supra note 34, at 147-49. The Court's approval of a cost-plus contract excep-
tion followed from the Hanover Shoe Court's adoption of such an exception in the
defensive context. See Ilinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36 (citing Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S.
at 494). The Hanover Shoe Court noted that where the plaintiff was committed to a
preexisting cost-plus contract, the defendant could easily prove that the plaintiff was
not damaged. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494. The Court determined that under such
circumstances, the policies supporting the prohibition of the pass-on defense were not
applicable. Id
56. See, e.g., Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 761 & n.10 (10th Cir.
1981) (cost-plus contract exception should be narrowly construed), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 941 (1982); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical Enters., 628 F.2d 971,
975-77 (6th Cir. 1980) (general contractor's contract with price-fixing subcontractor
is not substantial equivalent of pre-existing cost-plus contract), cert. demed, 450 U.S.
966 (1981); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 633 (4th Cir.
1979) (finding no cost-plus equivalent where gasoline retailers were forced to vary
their prices in relation to fixed wholesale prices), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
57. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
58. Id. at 579-80. In Mid-West, a wholesaler and a group of retailers sued five
manufacturers of consumer bags for damages resulting from an alleged price fixing
scheme. Id. at 575-76. One group of plaintiffs did not purchase bags directly from
the defendant. Id. at 578. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the cost-
plus contract exception "should be interpreted expansively so as to permit recovery"
[Vol. 29: p. 801
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li'n,59 the Fifth Circuit expanded the exception to allow offensive passed-on
damage claims in circumstances which constitute the "functional
equivalent" of the cost-plus contract situation.
60
Dicta in Illinois Brick has led to a second exception authorizing indirect
purchasers to sue remote sellers who own or control their direct purchasers.
61
Although one court has expansively interpreted "ownership or control," 62
other courts have confined the exception within narrow limits. 6 3 In Mid-
West, the Third Circuit rendered a particularly strict reading of the excep-
tion, ruling that a parent corporation's relationship with its subsidiary is not
sufficiently dominant to invoke the exception unless "the parent dominates
even if the contract did not fix the quantity of goods to be purchased. Id. at 57 n.9.
Additionally, they claimed that the exception should include informal arrangements
and patterns of cost-plus pricing. Id. The exception could not be stretched beyond
the explicit limits laid down in Illinois Brick, the court noted, because the Ilnois Brick
Court "explicitly rejected any exception for 'cost based rules of thumb' and other
informal arrangements." I. at 577-78 n.9 (citing Ilhnois Brick, 431 U.S. at 743-44).
59. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
60. Id. In BeefIndustiy, cattle producers sued supermarket chains for artificially
depressing wholesale beef prices by agreeing not to pay more than a fixed price. Id.
at 1153. The plaintiffs alleged that the chains could dictate the wholesale prices to
meat packers because they wielded oligopoly power and because the packers, unlike
the chains, had no long-range facilities to store beef and drive up its price. id. at
1154. The processors' only recourse was to pass on the undercharge by reducing the
price they would pay for cattle. Id. The plaintiff cattle producers were forced to sell
at the depressed price because fattened cattle become less valuable if they are not
sold within three weeks of the time they reach choice grade. Id. Thus, the packers
had no incentive to absorb any of the chain's undercharge. Id. at 1164-65. Because
the short-term inelastic price conditions of the beef market would make it easy to
calculate the amount of any pass-on, the court concluded that " [t]he plaintiffs have
alleged the functional equivalent of cost-plus contracts." Id.
61. See llhhois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. The Illinois Brick Court actually re-
ferred to the ownership or control exception as a pass-on defense. See id. ("Another
situation [in addition to the cost-plus contract context] in which market forces have
been superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct pur-
chaser is owned or controlled by its customer."). However, the cases cited by the
Court in support of this proposition involved offensive pass-on theory. Id. (citing
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1969) (parent-subsidiary relation-
ship between seller and direct purchaser); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487
F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973) (seller controlled direct purchaser by financial arrange-
ments), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974)). Accordingly, the lower courts have not lim-
ited this exception to the defensive context. See, e.g., In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust
Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 19 (3d Cir. 1978) (ownership or control exception applicable to
offensive pass-on theory); accord Dart Drug Corp. v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F.
Supp. 1091, 1102-03 (D. Md. 1979).
62. See, In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litig., 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,604, at 72,496-
97 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (independent purchasing agent who sold at prices dictated by
seller for a fee unrelated to the number of goods sold is sufficiently controlled by seller
to invoke the ownership control exception).
63. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical Enter., 628 F.2d 971 (6th
Cir. 1980) (control exception "is limited to relationships involving such functional
economic or other unity between the direct purchaser and either the defendant or the
indirect purchase that there has effectively been one sale"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966
(1981); accord In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1162 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
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and controls the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary is deemed to
be an agent of the parent." '64
Many courts are reluctant to bar the offensive use of pass-on theory in
factual contexts which differ from that of Illinois Brtck. 65 For example, in
Dart Drug v. Corning Glass Works,6 6 a federal district court held that Illinois
Brick did not bar section 4 claims by indirect purchasers based on discrimi-
natory conduct. 67 In Dart Drug, the plaintiff, an indirect purchaser of the
64. Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 589 (citing P. F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d
261, 266-67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970)).
The Mid-West opinion seems difficult to reconcile with an earlier Third Circuit
opinion. Compare In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978) (rule
of Ilhois Brick cannot be evaded by simple expedient of inserting a subsidiary be-
tween the violators and the first noncontrolled purchaser) with Mid-West, 596 F.2d at
589 (only under certain circumstances, such as when the parent dominates and con-
trols its subsidiary, will the parent and subsidiary be treated as one entity). The Mid-
West court attempted to distinguish the Sugar Industry case by asserting that the Mid-
West plaintiff could have sued the subsidiary if it participated in the price-fixing con-
spiracy. Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 589. Unfortunately, the court did not explain why
the Sugar Industiy plaintiff could not or should not have done the same thing. See id.
65. See, e.g., Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1980)
(llinozi Brick does not bar suits by indirect purchasers who are the target of an unlaw-
ful conspiracy) (dicta); In re Fine Paper Litig. State of Wash., 632 F.2d 1081, 1090 (3d
Cir. 1980) (partial assignment of cause of action by direct purchasers to indirect pur-
chasers does not conflict with policies enunciated in Illinois Brick); In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981) (Ilhnois Brick not applicable
where indirect purchaser buys from participant in the antitrust conspiracy); Pollock
v. Citrus Assoc. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., 512 F. Supp. 711, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(fact that buyers and sellers utilized agents in entering futures contract did not re-
quire conclusion that buyer was an indirect purchaser); Soskel v. Texaco, 514 F.
Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (fact that plaintiffs purchased overpriced gasoline from
Texaco franchises did not require conclusion that they were not direct purchasers of
Texaco); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 119 (D. Minn. 1980) (where
manufacturer and seller maintain a resale price maintenance conspiracy, plaintiff
purchaser is a "direct purchaser" for purposes of applying Ilhnois Brik); Zenith Ra-
dio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (I/Ihnois
Brick not applicable to manufacturer's claim that the Japanese electronics industry
engaged in a conspiracy to flood the American msrket with low-cost goods) aJ'd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part sub noma. In re Japanese Electronics Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983) (without addressing pass-on theory); In re Airport
Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Calif. 1979) (car rental com-
pany not barred from suing on theory that airport and other car rental agencies
conspired to exclude plaintiff's licensees from operating business on airport premises).
On the other hand, some courts have extended the prohibition of pass-on theory
to circumstances which differ from those present in Ilhhois Brick, such as claims by
sellers who allege that indirect purchasers were involved in a conspiracy to hold the
purchase price of products at artificially low levels. See, e.g., Zinser v. Continental
Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff wheat farmers precluded from
maintaining suit against grain companies on theory that grain companies conspired
to cause middlemen to purchase wheat at artificially low prices), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
941 (1982); cf In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1979)
(claims for damages by cattlemen due to an alleged combination of retail food chains
to limit beef prices were properly determined to be within the ambit of llhnois Brick),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
66. 480 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1979).
67. Id. at 1101. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant "abused its alleged mo-
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defendant's products, pursued several causes of action, including a price fix-
ing allegation and several claims of discriminatory conduct. 68 The court
quickly dismissed the price fixing allegations because the plaintiff could not
prove them without introducing pass-on evidence. 69 However, because the
court believed that Illinois Brick barred suits based on pass-on theory "only in
those situations where the plaintiff's injury is premised on an 'overcharge,' "
it declined to dismiss the claims of discriminatory conduct.70 The court
noted that "to the extent that plaintiff was the victim of such conduct, it is
the one who was directly injured. '7 1 The court determined that proof of the
amount charged the plaintiff over the amount charged its competitors
nopoly position by engaging in discriminatory conduct which injured competition in
plaintiff's market and thereby injured the plaintiff in its business or property." Id.
The court noted that "[i]n order to prove this injury plaintiff will have to show dis-
crimination in the prices, services, and products which defendant made available to
plaintiff in contrast to those offered to plaintiffs competitors." Id.
68. Id. at 1096. The Dart Drug plaintiff alleged a conspiracy between the manu-
facturer-defendant and others to monopolize the market for certain glass products in
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in
relevant part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony ...
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
The plaintiff alleged that Corning Glass Works and others engaged in an unlaw-
ful combination to monopolize the "manufacture, distribution and sale of glass and
glass ceramic utensils for the cooking and storage of food which have the characteris-
tic of being resistant both to extreme high and low temperatures while at the same
time having decorative qualities rendering them useful and desirable for the serving
of food." 480 F. Supp. at 1096.
69. 480 F. Supp. at 1097-1106. The Dart Drug court considered whether the
plaintiff's price-fixing claims fell within the Illinois Brick "ownership or control" ex-
ception. Id at 1102-04. The plaintiff had alleged in its amended complaint that the
defendant had engaged in a vertical conspiracy with wholesalers or distributors. Id.
at 1103. The plaintiff argued that the allegation of the existence of the conspiracy
was "sufficient to raise the issue of defendant's control of the intermediate level in the
chain of distribution, bringing plaintiff within the control exception." Id. Because
the alleged co-conspirators were not named as parties defendant, the court dismissed
the claims against the defendant. Id. The court noted that the defendant could not
utilize a finding of a vertical conspiracy in the present case to prevent the alleged co-
conspirators from denying the conspiracy and suing the defendant in a separate ac-
tion. Id. (quoting In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980)). For a discussion of the "ownership or con-
trol" exception to the llinois Brick rule, see notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of the applicability of Illinois Brick to vertical conspiracies, see notes
74-79 and accompanying text infra.
70. 480 F. Supp. at 1101 (citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)). In addition
to the overcharge requirement, the court noted, Illnois Brick "bars suit
only. . .where, in order to prove [his] injury, plaintiff must also demonstrate that
persons in the chain of distribution between plaintiff and the antitrust violator passed
on the overcharge to the plaintiff." Id. Accord Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
512 F. Supp. 108, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
71. 480 F. Supp. at 1101. The court also held that the rule of Illinois Brick was
inapplicable to allegations that the defendant had conspired with its distributors to
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"would not involve proof of the amount of the overcharge which was passed
down the chain of distribution. '7 2 Instead, the court reasoned, a compari-
son of the relative prices charged the plaintiff and its competitors would ap-
proximate the damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the
refuse to deal with the plaintiff. Id. at 1105. The court noted that such claims do not
involve proof of a passed-on overcharge. Id.
72. Id. at 1101. Because the plaintiff was alleging discriminatory conduct, the
court explained, no proof of passed-on charges was necessary "because 'pass-on' is
irrelevant to the case." Id. Accord Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 512 F.
Supp. 108, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Chatham Brass, a manufacturer sued another
manufacturer for damages resulting from the alleged monopolization by the defend-
ant of the market for certain air conditioner components in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 110, 116. For the pertinent text of § 2 of the Sherman Act, see
note 68 supra. The Chatham Brass plaintiff alleged that the defendant set up a two-
tiered pricing system which denied the plaintiff the right to purchase goods from the
defendant at favorable prices. 512 F. Supp. at 110-11. The plaintiff was thereby
forced to purchase the goods from certain direct purchasers who were able to obtain
the goods from the defendant at the lower price. Id. at 111. In rejecting the defend-
ant's assertion of an Illihois Brck defense, the court concluded that the plaintiff was
"complaining, not of injury resulting from the passing on of a price-fixing overcharge
by a middleman, but rather of direct injury from Honeywell's alleged success in cre-
ating sufficient monopoly power to raise prices." Id. at 116.
The plaintiff also alleged the existence of a conspiracy between the defendant
and certain unnamed distributors to set territorial limits on resales of the defendant's
products to achieve a monopoly position for the products and to exclude non-
cooperating purchasers such as the plaintiff from the market. Id. The court rejected
the defendant's assertion of the rule of Illhois Brtck.
llhhoi Brick does not apply at all to this factual situation: this is not a claim
by a plaintiff injured only by virtue of its status as an indirect purchaser;
rather, it is a claim by a plaintiff asserting that it has been forced to assume
the status of an indirect purchaser and to bear the additional costs incident
to that status as a direct result of a conspiracy whose purpose and effect was
to exclude it and other noncooperating distributors from favored purchaser
status, in violation of the antitrust laws.
Id.
The Second Circuit has also indicated recognition of a "target of the conspiracy"
exception to lliois Brick. Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 48-49 (2d
Cir. 1980). In Schwtnmer, a seller of television and electronic appliances sued an elec-
tronics manufacturer, alleging that the defendant engaged in a conspiracy with its
dealers to employ anticompetitive devices to damage the seller's business. Id. at 42-
43. The Second Circuit warned that "a court must guard against a situation in
which a seller interposes a middleman as a shield against an antitrust liability, espe-
cially where the middleman is a subsidiary of the seller." Id at 48-49 (footnotes omit-
ted). The court ruled that "an indirect purchaser is considered a 'target' of a seller's
price discrimination if there is evidence that the discrimination was 'aimed at' the
indirect purchaser by virtue of the nature and foreseeable effect of the antitrust con-
spiracy." Id. at 49. The court affirmed the lower court's determination that the
plaintiff was not in the target area of the alleged conspiracy and dismissed the claims.
Id.
The Schwimmer court discussed a target area exception to I'nois Brck in its anal-
ysis of the plaintiff's standing to sue. Id. at 46-49. The Dart Drug court, on the other
hand, clearly distinguished its discussion of standing from the discussion of llinois
Brick's applicability to claims of discriminatory conduct. Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at
1101.
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defendant's discriminatory conduct. 73
Other courts have held the rule of Illinois Brick inapplicable where the
plaintiff purchased directly from an intermediary who participated in a ver-
tical conspiracy 74 to violate the antitrust laws. 75 In Fontana Aviation v. Cessna
Aircrafq Co., 76 the Seventh Circuit indicated its approval of such an excep-
tion, even though the alleged co-conspirator intermediary was not named as
a defendant in the action. 77 Some courts have been more reluctant to recog-
nize the exception absent joinder of all conspirators, because a finding of a
vertical conspiracy would have no collateral estoppel effect in an action by
the unnamed conspirator seeking damages from the defendant in the origi-
nal action. 78 These courts have reasoned that without joinder of all co-con-
73. Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101. The court also concluded that Illinois Brick
would not bar the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 1104-05. For a discus-
sion of Illinois Brick's relevance to actions for injunctions, see notes 80-85 and accom-
panying text infra.
74. A vertical conspiracy involves an agreement between buyers and sellers in
the vertical chain of distribution. See generally E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER
42-46 (1973). A horizontal conspiracy involves an agreement between parties which
compete with one another. Id.
75. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 119 (D. Minn. 1980) (where
plaintiff purchases from a participant in resale price maintenance conspiracy, over-
charge is incurred directly); Gas-A-Tron v. American Oil Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas.
61,789 (D. Ariz. 1977) (no passed-on overcharge exists where plaintiff purchases from
participant in vertical conspiracy). For a discussion of the applicability of the Illnois
Brick rule to vertical conspiracies, see generally Comment, supra note 33, at 331-32,
and authorities cited therein.
76. 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 479. Fontana Aviation involved a suit by a seller of new and used air-
craft against Cessna Aircraft and its wholly owned financing subsidiary. Id. at 478-
79. The plaintiff, who was also in the business of performing custom installation of
non-Cessna avionics equipment, sought damages for the defendants' alleged attempt
to monopolize the avionics equipment market. Id. at 479. Because the plaintiff did
not purchase aircraft directly from Cessna but through an independent dealer, the
district court, relying on Illinois Brick, granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id. The Seventh Circuit, noting that the plaintiff alleged that the in-
dependent dealer was a co-conspirator, reversed, ruling that "[w]e are not satisfied
that the llhhois Brick rule applies in circumstances where the manufacturer and the
intermediary are both alleged to be co-conspirators in a common illegal enterprise
resulting in intended injury to the buyer." Id. at 481. Cf Florida Power Corp. v.
Granlund, 78 F.R.D. 441, 443 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (failure to recognize vertical conspir-
acy exception "would immunize from antitrust liability any manufacturer who con-
spired with his suppliers to fix the price of the supplied raw material").
Alternatively, the Fontana Aviation court ruled that Ilhnois Brick did not bar financial
recovery to the plaintiff, who did not "seek damages for an illegal indirect overcharge
passed on to it as is prohibited by Ilhois Brick, but sue[d] on the basis of a combina-
tion of acts allegedly causing competitive injury which destroyed its avionics busi-
ness." Id. Cf Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101 (Illinois Brick not applicable where
defendant engages in discriminatory conduct to damage plaintiff's business). For a
discussion of Dart Drug, see notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
78, See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). The Beef Industiy court was con-
cerned that the unnamed conspirator-intermediary in the suit could successfully con-
vince another court that no conspiracy existed and recover against the BeefIndusty
1983-84]
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spirators, the Illinois Brick policy of avoiding the risk of duplicative recovery
was directly contravened. 79
Courts have been particularly reluctant to apply Ilhnois Brick to claims
for injunctive relief.80 In Mid-West, the Third Circuit argued that the con-
siderations of Ilhinois Brick-the risk of duplicative recoveries and trial com-
plications-were not present in section 16 actions for injunctive relief.8,
Noting that the language and judicial construction of sections 482 and 1683
reflected a policy favoring liberal dispensation of injunctive relief,8 4 the
court concluded that Illinois Brick did not affect section 16 claims.8 5
defendants. Id. The court concluded that because the intermediaries were not par-
ties to the suit, "the possibility of inconsistent adjudications on the issue of the exist-
ence of a vertical conspiracy leaves the defendant subject to the risk of multiple
liability that the Ilhnois Brick Court found unacceptable." Id Accord In re Coordi-
nated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 972 (1984) (retail dealers must be joined as
defendants if plaintiffs seek to prove conspiracy with defendant oil companies); Tech-
nical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Antiengesellschaft, 1980-81 Trade
Cas. 63,612 (D. Md. 1980) (Illinois Brick does not permit an unnamed co-conspira-
tor exception). But cf In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287,
1296 (D. Md. 1981) (plaintiffs permitted to amend complaint to include unnamed
co-conspirators as defendants). Some courts have impliedly recognized an unnamed
co-conspirator exception, but none of these courts have analyzed the exception in
terms of the risk of multiple liability. See Fontana Aviation, 617 F.2d at 481; Abrams v.
Interco, 1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486
F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1980); Vermont v. Densmore Brick Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
63,347 (D. Vt. 1980); In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litig., 1978-1 Trade Cas.
62,059 (M.D. Pa. 1978). It is doubtful that the Beef lndustry court's concern with
inconsistent adjudications would be applicable to the Fontana Aviation case, which did
not involve passed-on overcharges. See 617 F.2d at 478-81.
One court, while accepting the reasoning of Beef Industry, has ruled that joinder
of co-conspirators is not necessary where the plaintiff claims to have been the direct
target of the conspiracy. See Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell Inc., 512 F. Supp. 108,
112, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For a discussion of Chatham Brass, see note 72 supra.
79. For a discussion of cases which have rejected an unnamed co-conspirator
exception due to the risk of multiple liability, see note 78 supra.
80. See, e.g., Beeflndustry, 600 F.2d at 1167 (policy considerations underlying
pass-on rule inapplicable to suits for injunctive relief). AccordDart Drug, 480 F. Supp.
at 1105.
81. Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 590.
82. For the text of § 4 of the Clayton Act, see note 16 supra.
83. For the text of § 16 of the Clayton Act, see note 17 supra.
84. 596 F.2d at 590-92. The Mid-West court was influenced by the Supreme
Court's decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). See Mid-
West, 596 F.2d at 591 n.70. In the context of a case that did not directly implicate
pass-on theory, the Hawaii v. Standard Oil Court distinguished § 4 suits for damages
from § 16 actions for injunctions. Hawaii v. Standard Oi, 405 U.S. at 260-62. The
Court noted that whereas "[a]ny person, firm, corporation or association" is entitled
to injunctive relief, the § 4 damage remedy is limited to persons "who shall be injured
in [their] business or property." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 26, 15 (1982)). The Court
concluded that the contrast in language was due to Congressional recognition of es-
sential differences in the nature of relief: whereas one injunction against an activity is
as effective as a hundred, multiple suits for damages will lead to multiple recoveries.
Id at 261-62. For further discussion of Hawaii v. Standard Oil, see note 52 supra.
85. 596 F.2d at 594.
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In Blue Shield v. McCready,86 the Supreme Court considered the applica-
bility of pass-on restrictions in circumstances which differed sharply from
those of Illinois Brck.87 Blue Shield involved a class action brought by a pre-
paid health plan subscriber who alleged a conspiracy between Blue Shield
and a group of psychiatrists to prevent psychologists from receiving compen-
sation under the plan. 88 The defendant argued that Illinois Brick required
that recovery under section 4 be limited to the psychologist rather than the
patient.8 9 Because the psychologist had been fully paid, the Court deter-
mined that he could not claim to have suffered any injury. 90 Under those
circumstances, the Court ruled, the risk of duplicative recovery, with which
the Ilhnois Brick Court was concerned, was not present. 9 1
86. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
87. Id. at 474-75. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726. In Ilhnois Brick, a group of
indirect purchasers sued a concrete block manufacturer, alleging that the manufac-
turer's overcharge had passed through two levels of distribution to the plaintiffs. Id.
In Blue Shield, a health plan subscriber sued a health plan for damages resulting from
its practice of refusing reimbursement for psychotherapy performed by psychologists
while providing reimbursement for comparable treatment by psychiatrists. 457 U.S.
at 467. Unlike Illinois Brick, Blue Shield did not involve passed-on overcharges. Id. at
467, 474-75. The issues in Blue Shield were (1) whether the policies enumerated in
Illinois Brick would be implicated by permitting plaintiff to sue; and (2) whether the
injury was too remote from the antitrust violation to give the plaintiff standing to
sue. 457 U.S. at 474-75, 476. For a discussion of the distinction between these two
issues, see note 91 in/ia.
88. 457 U.S. at 467-68. McCready was a member of a group plan, which her
employer had purchased from Blue Shield. Id. at 468. The plan specifically provided
that a portion of the cost of any necessary outpatient psychotherapy would be reim-
bursed. Id. However, Blue Shield reimbursed subscribers for psychotherapy only
where a psychiatrist had performed the services. Id. McCready claimed reimburse-
ment for the cost of treatment by a clinical psychologist, but these claims were "rou-
tinely denied." id.
McCready brought suit under § 4 on behalf of all Blue Shield subscribers who,
over a 5-year period, had incurred costs for psychological services but who had not
been reimbursed. Id. at 468-69. She alleged that Blue Shield had conspired with the
Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia "to exclude and boycott psychologists from re-
ceiving compensation under" the health plans and that the denial of her claim for
reimbursement had been in furtherance of this conspiracy. Id. at 469-70 (quoting
Appellee's Brief at 44) (further citations omitted). The district court granted defend-
ant's motion to dismiss on the ground that clinical psychologists were the parties
competitively endangered by the alleged conspiracy, and that plaintiffs injury was
"too indirect and remote to be considered 'antitrust injury.' " Id. at 470-71 (quoting
Appellee's Brief at 18).
89. Id. at 472-75. McCready did not allege a passed-on overcharge, as opposed
to the plaintiffs in Illinois Brick. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27. The Blue Shield
Court could have ruled that Illinois Brick was inapplicable to claims which are not
based on proof of passed-on overcharges; instead, the Court distinguished the facts in
Blue Shieldfrom the concerns of Illinois Brick. See Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 474-75. Prior
to Blue Shield, some lower federal courts had indicated that Illinois Brick was limited to
"overcharge" circumstances. See, e.g., Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101. For a discus-
sion of Dart Drug, see notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
90. 457 U.S. at 475.
91. Id. at 474-75. The Court next considered whether the plaintiff had suffered
an injury too remote from the alleged antitrust violation to give her standing to sue
for damages under section 4. Id. at 476-84. See Illinois Brick, 457 U.S. at 474-75. The
1983-84]
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The Court explained that Illinois Brick had rejected apportionment of
damages between direct and indirect purchasers because the concomitant
splintered recoveries and litigative burdens would undermine active private
enforcement of the antitrust laws. 92 Because Blue Shield did not involve a
Court noted that the rule of llhnois Brick was "analytically distinct" from the issue of
antitrust standing. Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 476. Some confusion had existed among
the federal courts as to whether Illhnois Brick had created a rule of standing. See, e.g.,
Parkview Markets Inc. v. The Kroger Co., 1978 Trade Cas. $ 62,373 (S.D. Ohio
1978) (plaintiff lacked "standing" under Illinois Brick). Despite the Supreme Court's
clear instruction that the concepts were distinct, at least one federal court does not
distinguish the concerns of Illinois Brick from the issue of antitrust standing. See Stein
v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 1982) (the Illinois Brick Court
"denied standing' to an indirect purchaser) (emphasis added).
"The term 'standing' denotes the status of being a proper party to maintain a
private antitrust action." Berger & Bernstein, An Analytlcal Framework for Antitrust
Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 810 n.4 (1977). The determination of whether a plaintiff
satisfies antitrust standing requirements involves analysis akin to proximate cause
considerations. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49, 89 (1969). The
Blue Shield Court concluded that the plaintiff had established sufficient standing be-
cause her injury flowed logically from the claimed violations and the defendants'
scheme fell squarely within the area of Congressional concern. Blue Shield, 457 U.S.
at 484.
Prior to Blue Shield, the Supreme Court had declined to address the standing
issue squarely. See Note, Right to Sue Under Section I of the Clayton Act-The Employee
Discharged for Refuzsal to Participate in the Anticompetitive Practices of Hi Employer. Bichan
v. Chemetron Corp. Examined in Light of Blue Shield v. McCready, 1983 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 173, 185 n.77. As a result, the lower federal courts were left to formulate their
own standing tests. See id. at 179 n.44. The Third Circuit had proposed a "factual
matrix" text in Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equip. Co., 543 F.2d 501, 506
(3d Cir. 1976). See also Bravman v. Bassatt Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). The Blue Shield Court expressly declined to
evaluate this approach or any other standing test. Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 476 n.12.
The Third Circuit's most detailed discussion of the standing issue is contained in
Mid-West Paper Prods. v. Continental Co., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979). In Mid-
West, the plaintiff pursued several claims against an antitrust violator, including an
allegation that the defendant was liable for damages resulting from the plaintiffs
purchases of goods from the defendant's non-conspirator competitor. Id. at 580. The
plaintiff theorized that the defendant's conduct permitted competitors to raise price
levels to heights that otherwise would not be possible. Id. The court formulated a
multi-factored standing test which grafted the "analytically distinct" issues of the
definition of antitrust injury "and [the use of] pass-on theories upon the concept of
antitrust standing." Id. at 582. The standing question, the court reasoned, involved
several considerations: whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury "of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the
defendants' acts unlawful," and whether a consideration of the risks of duplicative
recovery and trial complications mitigated against permitting the plaintiff to pursue
his claim. Id. at 582-83 (citing Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
488-89 (1977)) (other citations omitted). The court concluded that "the line drawing
that necessarily takes place is informed by what posture best effectuates the dual
purpose of the treble damage remedy . . .while at the same time furthering the
overriding goals of the antitrust laws-preserving competition." Id. at 583. The
court decided that although the plaintiff was within the level of the economy
threatened by the price-fixing scheme, he was not "among those 'whose protection is
the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws,' " and thus should not be afforded
standing. Id. (quotation not identified by the court).
92. Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 474 (citing llinoiS Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-47). The
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chain of plaintiffs claiming damages from a single transaction which violated
the antitrust laws, the Court determined that Illinois Brick should not bar
recovery.
9 3
Against this background, the Merican court considered whether the rule
of Ilhnois Brick precluded plaintiff trading companies from maintaining a
treble damage claim against their indirect seller for injury resulting from an
alleged conspiracy to destroy the plaintiffs' business. 94 Judge Hunter, writ-
ing for the court, acknowledged the Supreme Court's interpretation of con-
gressional intent to limit the availability of the section 4 remedy. 95 He noted
that in response to this intent, the Supreme Court recognized two distinct
types of limitations on the availability of the section 4 remedy: the require-
ments of antitrust standing and the rule of Illinois Brick.96 Consideration of
Blue Shield Court continued: "The [llhnois Brick] Court concluded that direct pur-
chasers rather than indirect purchasers were the injured parties who as a group were
most likely to press their claims with the vigor that the § 4 treble damages remedy
was intended to promote." Id. (citing llhnois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735).
In addition, the Blue Shield Court stated that its prior cases illustrated a
subordinate concern:
Where consistent with the broader remedial purpose of the antitrust laws,
we have sought to avoid burdening § 4 actions with damages issues giving
rise to the need for "massive evidence and complicated theories" where the
consequences would be to discourage vigorous enforcement of the antitrust
laws by private suits.
457 U.S. at 485 n. II (citation omitted).
93. 457 U.S. at 474-75.
94. 713 F.2d at 962 & n.7. For a discussion of the plaintiffs' allegations, the
defendant's motion to dismiss, and the question certified for appeal to the Third
Circuit, see notes 16-23 and accompanying text supra.
95. 713 F.2d at 962 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251,
263 n.14 (1972) ("Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in
damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.")
(further citation omitted).
Judge Hunter stated that the Supreme Court had mandated a consideration of
§ 4 claims "in light of the statutory purposes behind the awarding of treble damages:
to deter antitrust violators and deprive them of 'the fruits of their illegality,' and to
compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries." 713 F.2d at 962-63
(quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978)).
96. 713 F.2d at 963 (citing Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 465; In re Coordinated Pre-
trial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1982)). The first limitation, Judge Hunter explained, identifies "certain classes
of plaintiffs who, although able to trace an injury to an antitrust violation, are gener-
ally not within the group of 'private attorneys general' Congress created to enforce
the antitrust laws under section 4." 713 F.2d at 963 (citing Illinois Brik, 431 U.S. at
746; Hawaii. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 262). For a discussion of Ilhnoi Brick in gen-
eral and the Court's holding that indirect purchasers could not sue under § 4 based
on passed-on overcharges, see notes 42-55 and accompanying text supra. For a discus-
sion of Hawaii v. Standard Oil, and the limitation on § 4 suits by states as parenspatrae,
see note 52 supra.
The second limitation on § 4 actions, Judge Hunter continued, was the "analyti-
cally distinct" and " 'conceptually more difficult question "of which persons have
sustained injuries too remote [from an antitrust violation] to give them standing to sue
for damages under § 4."' " 713 F.2d at 964 (quoting Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 476
(quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7)) (emphasis supplied by the Blue Shield
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the latter limitation, which the district court ignored,97 resulted in the Third
Circuit's dismissal of the section 4 claim.
98
Judge Hunter explained that the Ilhnois Brick Court was motivated by
two policies when it held that indirect purchasers in a chain of distribution
could not assert a section 4 action based on the theory that the direct pur-
chasers had passed on overcharges imposed by the antitrust violater. 99 The
first policy, he stated, was to prevent the risk of duplicative recovery which
would arise if every person in the chain of distribution could recover dam-
ages based on the same violation.100 The second policy identified by Judge
Hunter was to avoid discouraging private enforcement of the antitrust laws
by burdening section 4 actions with complicated damage issues such as the
theory of passed-on damages.°10 Judge Hunter indicated that these two pol-
icies must be considered in light of the broader remedial purposes of the
antitrust laws in order to determine whether the plaintiff in a given case
ought to be permitted to maintain a treble damages action.
0 2
Court). For a discussion of Blue Shield, the relevant factors in the antitrust standing-
proximate cause analysis, and the approach taken by the Third Circuit, see note 91
supra.
97. 713 F.2d at 966. As Judge Hunter noted, Caterpillar claimed that plaintiffs'
alleged injury was dependent upon the decision of a Caterpillar-authorized dealer to
raise his prices in response to the smaller discount given on sets to be used outside his
service area, essentially a pass-on theory. Id. at 965. For a complete discussion of the
events which gave rise to the suits, see notes 1-15 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Hunter stated that while the defendant argued that Illinols Brick precluded suit
by an indirect purchaser based on passed-on damages, the district court's denial of
the motion to dismiss was based "on the analytically distinct issue of whether [plain-
tiffs] had 'standing' to maintain an action for damages." 713 F.2d at 966. The Third
Circuit noted that the district court concluded the plaintiffs had standing because
they had alleged that they were the direct target of an unlawful conspiracy which
forced them out of business. Id. While acknowledging that the fact that plaintiffs
were targeted might be relevant under Blue Shield standing analysis, Judge Hunter
stated that the target theory was not relevant under Illinois Brick. Id. (citations omit-
ted). He continued: "We do not suggest that standing issues should have been ig-
nored by the district court, only that they limit the § 4 remedy in a different way.
For the purposes of this appeal, Caterpillar has conceded that [plaintiffs] would have
standing if their claims are not barred by Illinois Bri k." Id. at 966 n. 19 (citing Brief
of Appellant at 5 n.4).
98. 713 F.2d at 966. Judge Hunter explained that the district court had failed
to conduct the proper inquiry under Ilhois Brzik, which was "whether [plaintiffs] are
in the class of persons considered to be injured in their business or property under
section 4 by an antitrust violation." Id. (citations omitted). This policy determina-
tion, he continued, is based on two factors: the possibility of duplicative recovery and
the potential for overly complex proofs of damages. Id. (citations omitted). The
Third Circuit found reversible error in the district court's failure to explicitly address
these issues. Id.
99. 713 F.2d at 963-64 (citations omitted). For a discussion of llin&oz Brick, see
notes 42-55 and accompanying text supra.
100. 713 F.2d at 963-64 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 964. Judge Hunter acknowledged that the Supreme Court had iden-
tified the complex damages limitation as a "subordinate theme." Id. at 964 n.10
(citing Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 475 n. 11).
102. See 713 F.2d at 964. Judge Hunter summarized: "Only by the careful
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The Third Circuit considered the plaintiffs' argument that the Ihinois
Brick bar was inapplicable to claims such as theirs, which did not involve
horizontal, above-market price-fixing. 10 3 Plaintiffs alleged that Caterpillar
had sought to eliminate their class of competition "through the innovative
mechanism of a vertically-imposed economic penalty," and argued that
dicta in Mid- West supported a distinction between this claim and a claim for
passed-on overcharges.10 4 The court rejected plaintiffs' reading and refused
to limit Ilhnois Bri'c to claims of horizontal price fixing brought by indirect
purchasers.' 0 5 The court reasoned that the availability of the section 4 rem-
application of [the principles of antitrust standing and Ilhinois Brck] to the multitude
of claims that potentially are swept within the scope of section 4 can courts properly
effectuate Congress' antitrust policies of deterring antitrust violators and compensat-
ing victims of anticompetitive behavior." Id. at 965.
103. 713 F.2d at 966.
104. Id. at 966-67 (citing Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 585 & n.47). Judge Hunter
noted that in Mid-West, the Third Circuit stated that a direct purchaser, consistent
with llhnoi Brick, could sue a price-fixing defendant because the damages were easily
ascertained as the benefit derived by the defendant. 713 F.2d at 966 (citing Mid-
West, 596 F.2d at 858) (footnote omitted). Judge Hunter then quoted the language
relied upon by plaintiffs to support their assertion that claims other than horizontal
above market price-fixing were outside the scope of llinois Brik.
A different problem is presented where prices are fixed below the com-
petitive market price or where defendants engaged in other forms of an-
ticompetitive conduct, such as group boycotts, vertical restrictions, or
monopolization, since defendants' benefits in those instances are not so
readily ascertainable, and may not be sufficient to compensate "those indi-
viduals whose protection is the primary purpose of the antitrust laws." In
such circumstances courts have awarded damages based upon the amount
of injury suffered by the plaintiff rather than the benefits derived by the
defendants.
713 F.2d at 966 (quoting Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 585 n.47).
The plaintiffs, focusing on the first sentence of the footnote, argued that the
listed types of anticompetitive conduct were per se outside the rule of Illinois Brck. Id.
at 966-67. By characterizing their claim as a challenge to the defendant's effort to
eliminate the plaintiffs' class of competitors from the market through a vertically-
imposed economic penalty, Judge Hunter continued, plaintiffs argued that their case
was outside the rule of llhnois Brick. Id. at 967.
105. 713 F.2d at 967. For a summary of the plaintiffs' interpretation of Mid-
West, see note 104 supra. The Merican court refused to regard Mid-West as holding
that claims other than horizontal price fixing were outside the scope of Ilhinois Brick:
Instead we read footnote forty-seven as observing that in certain situa-
tions the measure of damages for direct purchasers is based upon the injury
suffered by the plaintiff, not the benefit obtained by the defendant. When
defendants engage in below-market price fixing, group boycotts, vertical re-
straints, or monopolization, their benefits are sometimes not "readily ascer-
tainable" and thus damages sought by proper plaintiffs must be measured
by other means.
713 F.2d at 967.
The Third Circuit regarded its refusal to limit llhnois Brick to horizontal price
constraints as consistent with precedent in the Third Circuit and elsewhere. Id. (cit-
ing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)); Stein v.
United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982); Zinser v. Continental Grain Co.,
660 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); Edward J. Sweeny &
Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911
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edy depended not on the plaintiffs' characterization of the offense but on
whether the policies identified in Ilhnois Brick would be served if the claim
were allowed. 106
Next, the Third Circuit addressed the plaintiffs' argument that, even
considering the Illinois Brick policy concerns, their claim should be al-
lowed.1 0 7 The court noted that plaintiffs based this argument on their asser-
tion that the direct purchaser had executed an affidavit which established
that it had not suffered any injury which could form the basis of a section 4
action; hence there was no possibility of duplicative recovery. 10 8 Judge
Hunter responded that the plaintiffs had not alleged in their complaint that
the direct purchaser would not sue the defendant,' 0 9 nor had they presented
conclusive evidence that the direct purchaser had been spared injury."10
(1981); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 905 (1980).
106. 713 F.2d at 967-68. Judge Hunter reiterated: "Thus the scope of llinois
Brirk's rule barring treble damage actions by certain persons must be determined in
each case by examining whether allowing those persons to sue could create the possi-
bility of duplicative recovery and overly complex damage claims." Id. at 968 (foot-
note omitted).
107. Id at 968. The court noted that plaintiffs did not contend that they fell
within any of the exceptions specifically mentioned in Illinols Brick. Id. Because the
plaintiffs disavowed any reliance on a vertical conspiracy exception to Illhnois Brick,
the court reserved judgment as to whether the Third Circuit would recognize such an
exception. Id. at 968 n.22 (citing Brief of Appellees at 36 n.26).
108. Id. at 968. The court quoted the pertinent language from the affadavit of
the president of Ohio Machinery Co. (OMCO), the direct purchaser: "Neither the
existence of the 5% [service fee] nor any changes in Caterpillar's administration
thereof, including the 1978 or 1980 changes, has had any apparent effect on Ohio
Machinery's incentive or ability to sell Caterpillar electric generators sets outside its
service territory generally or in Saudi Arabia specifically." Id. (citing Appendix at
I 10E). Plaintiffs claimed that the affidavit had waived any cause of action that
OMCO might have against Caterpillar on the basis of the transactions involved in
plaintiffs' claim. Id at 968 (citing Brief of Appellees at 34).
The plaintiffs had also argued that the danger 6f duplicative recovery was not
present in the case "because they were suing not to recover the fee imposed by Cater-
pillar, but to recover the separate damages of [plaintiffs'] lost business and profits
resulting from application of that fee to [the direct purchaser]." Id. at 969 n.23 (cit-
ing App. at 4381-391). The court quickly dismissed this argument, noting that the
plaintiffs had admitted "that the issues were intertwined and that the damage calcu-
lation would concentrate on the increased amount OMCO had to pay for the sets."
Id (citing App. at 4401). Furthermore, the court asserted, "by arguing that their
damages are their lost profits resulthg from Caterpillar's imposing the service fee on
OMCO, [plaintiffs] implicate the second concern of Illinois Brik, that of overly com-
plex and speculative damage theories." Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
109. Id. at 968. The court noted, without deciding the issue, that the direct
purchaser could possibly still have a cause of action under the antitrust laws based on
the facts of the case. Id. at 968-69.
110. Id at 969. The court reasoned that the fact that the direct purchaser's sales
were not affected by Caterpillar's alleged antitrust violations "could merely reflect
that demand for the sets in Saudia [sic] Arabia was relatively inelastic with respect to
price." Id Noting that the direct purchaser would have a remaining claim that its
profit margin was less as a result of the defendant's action, the Mercan court con-
cluded that the risk of duplicative recovery existed. Id.
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Furthermore, the court ruled that the legislative purpose behind the treble
damage remedy was better served by concentrating recovery in the immedi-
ate purchaser than by apportioning damages over a larger class, even though
direct purchasers might not sue their suppliers in all cases.II
Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that their
proof of damages would not burden the trial with the "massive evidence and
complicated theories" that the Ilhnois Brick rule was designed to prevent by
observing that the plaintiffs' claims involved the same complications
presented by the plaintiffs' damage theory in llinois Brick.' 12 The court con-
cluded that "the damage issues [were] sufficiently uncertain so as to impair
the effectiveness of the section 4 remedy."' 13 Thus, the court held that
plaintiffs were not persons injured in their business or property by reason of
the antitrust laws within the meaning of section 4.114
Judge Higginbotham, in dissent, agreed with the majority's assertion
that the district court had failed to properly determine whether the potential
for double recovery and excessive complexity barred the plaintiffs' section 4
action under the rule of Ilhnois Brick. 115 However, he disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the policies identified in Ilinois Brick would be
advanced by dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of action.' 1 6 Judge Higginbot-
ham felt that "the prosecution of this suit would be both consistent with
Illinois Brick and necessary to avoid immunizing the anticompetitive tactic
which the plaintiffs allege."' "17
Judge Higginbotham read Blue Shield to mean that the Supreme Court
did not intend Illinois Brick to permit anticompetitive conduct to go unchal-
lenged in all cases where there was not a direct relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant. ' "I He concluded that the courts should not only
11. Id (quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741).
112. Id. The court stated that
to prove any damages . . . [plaintiffs] would have to calculate the service
fee on each generator set purchased by [the direct purchaser], determine
how the imposition of the fee and market forces affected the price paid by
[plaintiffs], and finally estimate how any increased price affected [plaintiff's]
profits and sales in light of competitive market forces in Saudi Arabia.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Third Circuit regarded this calculation as precisely what
the llhnois Brick Court sought to avoid. Id.
113. Id. While the court recognized "that damage analysis in antitrust actions is
often difficult and complex," it based its decision not on those factors, but on the
uncertainty of the proof. Id.
114. Id. For the relevant portions of § 4, see note 16 supra.
115. Id. at 970 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing llhnois Brick, 431 U.S. 720
(1977)). The dissent also agreed "that llinois Brick cannot be mechanically applied
so that an antitrust plaintiffs ability to recover turns upon the affixing of handy
labels to the nature of the wrong alleged or to the plaintiffs position in the marketing
hierarchy." Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Blue Shield, 457 U.S. 465 (1982)). For a discussion of the facts
and issues presented in Blue Shield, see notes 86-93 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Higginbotham quoted language from Blue Shield in which the Court stated
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be mindful of the policies underlying Ilhnois Brick, but also not lose sight of
the "overarching policy" favoring compensation of victims of antitrust viola-
tions, deterrence, and the preservation of competition.' 19 The plaintiffs'
claim, Judge Higginbotham argued, was based on an antitrust violation
which was different in kind from the horizontal conspiracy alleged in Ilhinois
Brick.120 He argued that when a vertical conspiracy is involved, the injuries
claimed are not simply passed on overcharges.' 2' Under such circumstances,
he contended, the goals of avoiding duplicative recovery and excessive com-
plexity do not warrant denying indirect purchasers a section 4 remedy.' 22
Finally, Judge Higginbotham concluded that dismissal of the plaintiffs'
suit would preclude regulation of an antitrust violation that could not other-
wise be policed: the predatory destruction of the plaintiffs' businesses. 123
In analyzing the Merican decision, it is suggested that the court correctly
that in certain limited circumstances, the feasibility of damage theories may be con-
sidered in determining who may sue under § 4 " '[where consistent with the broader
remedial purposes of the antitrust laws.' " 713 F.2d at 970 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)
(quoting Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 475 n. 11) (further quotation omitted) (emphasis
supplied by Judge Higginbotham).
119. 713 F.2d at 970 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (quoting Mid-West, 596
F.2d at 583).
120. Id. Judge Higginbotham claimed that the Third Circuit's discussion of the
sweep of Ilhnois Brick in Mid-West indicated the court's implicit recognition that the
unique nature of certain types of anticompetitive conduct, such as vertical conspira-
cies, inspired the court to assert that such conduct was outside the limits of Illnois
Bric. Id. at 970-71 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 585
n.47). For the text of footnote 47 and the interpretation given by the majority, see
notes 104-105 supra. Disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of Mid-West,
Judge Higginbotham felt that footnote 47 supported his conclusion that plaintiffs'
injuries were not the kind contemplated by the Illinois Brick Court:
I think it is clear from the context of footnote 47 and from its emphasis on
compensating the antitrust plaintiff that where an indirect purchaser has
suffered injury other than incurring the cost of the passed-on overcharge
neither the policy of compensating injury nor that of deterring anticompeti-
tive conduct can be realized unless the indirect purchaser can bring action
against the seller.
713 F.2d at 971 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 585 n.47
(quotation omitted)).
In Judge Higginbotham's view, the policy of avoiding complexity in treble dam-
ages actions originated in the belief that vigorous policing of the marketplace would
suffer if damages had to be allocated among multiple parties. Id. He quoted his own
statement from Mid-West: "'Where added complexity does not result in a disincen-
tive to the enforcement of the antitrust laws, its potency as an argument against
standing is seriously diminished.'" Id. (quoting Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 599 (Higgin-
botham, J., dissenting)).
121. Id. at 971 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham cited the
plaintiffs' claim as an example of the unique damages which result from antitrust
violations which are not horizontal price-fixing conspiracies. Id. The Merican plain-
tiffs had alleged loss of sales and profits, reduction in the value of goodwill, and
destruction of a significant portion of their business. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. For a discussion of the Dart Drug court's disposition of a similar argu-
ment, see notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
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distinguished standing analysis from pass-on theory.1 2 4 However, the case
demonstrates the conceptual difficulties which arise from application of the
rule of Illinois Bri'ck. 25 As the dissent intimated, the majority may have
reached a different result had they more closely compared the allegations
made by the plaintiffs in IlNois Brick with those made in the principal
case. 126
In Illinois Brick, the alleged goal of the antitrust violators was to gener-
ate oligopoly profits through the imposition of a price fixing scheme.1 2 7 Pre-
sumably, the violators did not care who was injured by their anticompetitive
conduct. 128 In Mer'can, unlike Illinois Brick, the plaintiffs-indirect purchasers
alleged that the defendant's goal was not to generate oligopoly profits but to
destroy the plaintiffs' businesses. 12 9 If this allegation is assumed to be
true, 130 then the defendant's scheme could not succeed unless a specific,
identifiable injury was imposed upon the plaintiffs. 13 1 Any injury to the
124. For a discussion of the distinction between standing analysis and pass-on
theory, see note 91 supra. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the differ-
ences between the two principles, see notes 96-98 and accompanying text supra.
125. For an exposition of these difficulties as framed by the dissent, see notes
115-23 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties
encountered by courts concerning applicability of the rule of lllioi Brick to vertical
conspiracies, see notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
Dart Drug court's refusal to apply the rule of Illinois Brick to claims of discriminatory
conduct, see notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
126. See Merican, 713 F.2d at 970 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higgin-
botham observed:
Although the majority correctly determines that mere nomenclature cannot
magically obviate consideration of the Illinois Brick issue, the differences be-
tween the injuries alleged here and those contemplated in Illlhois Brick, re-
quire us to ask whether the goals of avoiding duplicative recovery and
excessive complexity would be advanced by barring this suit.
Id.
127. See llhnois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27. For a discussion of the plaintiff's com-
plaint in Illinois Brick, see note 43 and accompanying text supra.
128. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 727.
129. 713 F.2d at 961. In Merican, the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy between
Caterpillar, one of its authorized dealers, and "other unnamed corporations, firms
and individuals . . . 'to allocate customers and territories for the sale of Caterpillar
electric generator sets and to foreclose [plaintiffs] and other generator set marketers
from engaging in price competition with defendant's authorized dealers.' " Id. at 961
& n.3 (quoting Complaint 21, app. at 18B).
130. See Merican, 713 F.2d at 965 n.18 (for purposes of the appeal, the court is
required to assume that the plaintiffs could prove the facts alleged in their amended
complaint) (citing Associated Gen'l Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 902 (1983)).
131. Id. at 961. It is submitted that this specific injury to the Merican plaintiffs is
different in kind from the injury imposed generally by the Illinois Brick defendants
upon its customers. Compare Mencan, 713 F.2d at 961 (plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy
"to allocate customers and territories for the sale of Caterpillar electric generator sets
and to foreclose [plaintiffs] and other generator set marketers from engaging in price
competition with defendant's authorized dealers") with Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 727
(plaintiffs alleged "a combination and conspiracy to fix the prices of concrete block in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."). The alleged conspiracies in both cases were
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direct purchaser was incidental to the activities aimed at the indirect pur-
chaser. 132 Conceptually, plaintiff's injury is qualitatively different from in-
juries suffered by others in the chain of distribution.13 3
Whatever the merits of the Ilhnois Brtck decision, it is questionable to
apply the doctrine when the direct and indirect purchasers have suffered
qualitatively different injuries. 134 Carried to its logical extreme, such a hold-
ing would bar suits by victims of discriminatory resale price maintenance
agreements or vertically imposed boycotts simply because a direct purchaser
similar in that both involved the retention of income by the violators. See Illinois
Brick, 431 U.S. at 727; Merican, 713 F.2d at 961. But in Merican, unlike Ilhiois Brick,
the retention of income was not necessary in order for the conspiracy to succeed. Cf
Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101 ("Proof of [plaintiff's] claim [of discriminatory con-
duct] does not in any way involve proof that defendant set prices of its goods above
the competitive market, resulting in an 'overcharge,' or proof that any overcharge
was passed on to plaintiff."). The accumulation of unclaimed service fees by the
Merican defendant was only an incidental effect of the defendant's attempt to reach
its ultimate goal. Merican, 713 F.2d at 961. This goal could have been achieved by
other types of conduct which would not have involved the accumulation of service
fees: for example, the defendant could have destroyed the plaintiffs' businesses by
imposing a boycott to prevent sales by its authorized dealers to the plaintiffs, a clearly
illegal activity. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)
(concerted refusal to deal is per se illegal). Such a scheme would have entitled the
plaintiff to § 4 relief. See Kor's v. Broadway Hales Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Cf
Merican, 713 F.2d at 968 n.21 (plaintiffs characterized defendants' actions as consti-
tuting an illegal boycott). Instead, the defendant (allegedly) pursued a scheme which
had the effect of damaging or destroying the plaintiffs' businesses, but which was
protected by the rule -of Illinois Brick.
132. For a discussion of the differences between the injuries alleged in Mercan
and those alleged in llhnois Brick, see notes 131 supra & 137-43 infra and accompany-
ing text.
133. 713 F.2d at 971 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (plaintiffs' alleged loss of
sales and profits, reduction in the value of goodwill and destruction of a significant
portion of their businesses are claims which only the plaintiffs could present). See
Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101 (plaintiff was only person who could effectively pres-
ent claim of injury due to discriminatory conduct).
Compare the allegations made by the Merican plaintiff concerning the objectives
of the conspiracy with the claims of discriminatory conduct made by the plaintiffs in
Dart Drug. See Dart Drugs, 480 F. Supp. 1099-1102. For a discussion of the Dart Drug
court's disposition of these claims, see notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra. It is
suggested that the Merican plaintiffs' claim that they were the direct target of an
antitrust conspiracy was equivalent to the Dart Drug plaintiffis claim that it was the
object of discriminatory conduct. See Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101. It is asserted
that the courts reached opposite results regarding these claims because the Merican
court focused on the factual similarities between llthois Brick and the case before it
while the Dart Drug court focused on the conceptual problems encountered when
attempting to apply pass-on theory to claims of discriminatory conduct. For a discus-
sion of the Aerican court's analysis of the plaintiffs' claims, see notes 113-15 and ac-
companying text supra. For a discussion of the Dart Drug court's analysis of the
applicability of pass-on theory to claims of discriminatory conduct, see notes 66-73
and accompanying text supra.
134. For a discussion of the distinction drawn by the Dart Drug court between
damages of direct purchasers and those of indirect purchasers where the indirect pur-
chaser alleges discriminatory conduct, see notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
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is interposed between defendant and plaintiff.135 The Merican decision gives
carte blanche to businesses who wish to avoid such distasteful tactics by
structuring anticompetitive transactions in a manner which outwardly re-
sembles the facts of Illnois Brick.
136
It is further suggested that the Merican court should not have equated
the plaintiffs' damage allegations with the type of damage claims involved in
the classic Illinois Brick circumstances. 13 7 In Dart Drug, the court carefully
differentiated the plaintiff's price fixing claims from its claims of discrimina-
tory conduct.1 38 It is submitted that this distinction is correctly based on the
recognition that pass-on theory is inapplicable to discriminatory schemes.'
39
In Illinois Brick, the focus of the damage inquiry was on the damages sus-
tained by the defendants' purchasers as a result of the defendants' alleged
price fixing conspiracy. 40 In Merican, it is suggested that the focus should
135. Resale price maintenance (also known as vertical price-fixing)
refers to an agreement in the form of a contract, combination, or conspiracy
between or among independent entities within a single chain of distribution
whereby, for example, a wholesaler and a retailer agree upon the price at
which the retailer will resell goods that the wholesaler sells to the retailer.
KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, § 10.15, at 115 (1980). A group boycott is the
means by which a concerted refusal to deal is effectuated. See id. § 10.27, at 155
n.500. "A concerted refusal to deal is defined as an agreement by two or more per-
sons not to do business with other individuals, or to do business with them only on
specified terms." Id. § 10.27, at 155.
Perhaps the Merican plaintiffs could have alleged the existence of a conspiracy
between the defendant and the direct purchaser from whom the plaintiffs purchased
goods. The fact that the direct purchaser may have been a less-than-willing partici-
pant and might in fact have been injured as a result of the alleged conspiracy does
not detract from its illegality. Cf Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6
(rejecting notion that there can be no violation of § I of the Sherman Act unless
benefit of anticompetitive agreement accrues to both parties to the agreement). The
Mencan plaintiffs could have then attempted to utilize the vertical co-conspirator ex-
ception to Illinois Brick. For a discussion of the vertical co-conspirator exception to
Ilhnois Brick, see notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
136. See Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, 78 F.R.D. 441 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (fail-
ure to recognize vertical conspiracy exception to Ilh)oz Brick would create a loophole
in antitrust laws).
137. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the plaintiffs' damage
claims, see note 116 supra. The Merican court was concerned that the plaintiffs would
have to focus on the overcharge paid by the direct purchaser in proving their damage
claims. 713 F.2d at 969 n.23. The court believed that such a proof would involve
complex damage theories. Id.
In Dart Drug, the court noted that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant
engaged in discriminatory conduct did not "involve proof that defendant set prices of
its goods above the competitive market, resulting in an 'overcharge,' or proof that
any such overcharge was passed on to plaintiff." Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101. It
is submitted that the Merican plaintiff also did not have to prove either of these fac-
tors. For a discussion of why the Merican plaintiffs would not have had to prove these
factors, see notes 139-42 and accompanying text infra.
138. See Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1099-1102.
139. For a discussion of the Dart Drug court's consideration of the applicability
of pass-on theory to claims of discriminatory conduct, see notes 70-73 and accompa-
nying text supra.
140. See Ilhnois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746-47. The plaintiffs in Merican, on the other
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have been on the damages sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the de-
fendant's discriminatory conduct.141 The damage inquiry, therefore, would
not involve proof of a passed-on overcharge' 42 but would instead focus upon
injuries flowing from the alleged discrimination. 143
Allowance of the Merican plaintiffs' claim would have been consistent
with the policies enumerated in Illhnots Brick. 144 It is submitted that Judge
Higginbotham was correct in stating that litigative burdens are not a proper
consideration for a dismissal of a section 4 action unless the consequence
would be to discourage vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws by private
suits. 145 This consideration was improperly applied to the claim of the
hand, asserted that the defendant manipulated its pricing policies to unfairly dis-
criminate against independent marketers of its generator sets. 713 F.2d at 960.
141. Cf Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101 (defendant's discriminatory conduct
will support plaintiffs claims). Had the Third Circuit framed the issue in this way,
then proof of a passed-on overcharge would have been irrelevant to the analysis. As
Judge Higginbotham noted, the Merican plaintiffs "allege[d] predatory destruction of
their business-a complaint which only they may bring." 713 F.2d at 971 (Higgin-
botham, J., dissenting). It is asserted that the plaintiffs' damages resulting from the
defendant's discriminatory conduct must be analyzed separately from any damage
incidentally sustained by the direct purchaser, who allegedly was only a conduit
through which the defendant could destroy the plaintiffs' businesses.
142. See Mercan, 713 F.2d at 971 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (Merican does
not involve proof of a passed-on overcharge). Although the Merican court focused on
the similarities between Merican and llhnois Brick, it did not go so far as to character-
ize Merican as involving an "overcharge." See id. at 966-69. It is submitted that be-
yond the technical accuracy of this approach is a conceptual difference which was
ignored by the court. In the normal overcharge case such as Ilhhnois Brick, the plaintiff
is injured by the overcharge itself. See Ilhnois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27. In Merican, it
was the defendant's discriminatory conduct which allegedly caused the plaintiffs'
damages. See 713 F.2d at 971 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (plaintiffs alleged pred-
atory destruction of their business). Cf Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101 ("it is defend-
ant's discriminatory conduct which will support [plaintiff's] claim, and to the extent
that plaintiff was the victim of such conduct, it is the one who was directly injured").
If the allegations in Mertan are assumed to be true, then the defendant's retention of
unclaimed service fees was only a means to the predatory end.
143. Cf Dart Drug, 480 F. Supp. at 1101. In Merican, like Dart Drug, the damage
inquiry could have involved a comparison of prices paid by plaintiffs to prices paid
by those who were not targets of the defendant's alleged scheme. Id. The Dart Drug
court noted that such an inquiry did not involve proof of the amount of an over-
charge passed down the claim of distribution. Id.
144. See Merican, 713 F.2d at 97 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (the goals of
avoiding duplicative recoveries and excessive complexity are not implicated by plain-
tiffs' allegation that defendant engaged in the predatory destruction of their
business).
145. See Merican, 713 F.2d at 971 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). It is further
submitted that the plaintiffs' claim would not involve the same damage analysis pro-
scribed in llhnois Brick. The Merican court reasoned:
To prove damages . . .Appellees would have to calculate the service fee on
each generator set purchased by OMCO, determine how the imposition of
the fee and market forces affected the price paid by appellees, and finally
estimate how any increased price affected Appellees' profits and sales in
light of competitive market forces in Saudi Arabia. That type of calcula-
tion was the very analysis the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Ilhois
Brick. ...
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plaintiffs, who appeared to be the only parties willing to pursue an antitrust
action against the defendant. 146 Furthermore, it is submitted that the plain-
tiffs' claim in Merican presented no danger of splintered or duplicative recov-
ery. Only the plaintiffs could recover for damages sustained as a result of the
defendant's alleged scheme to destroy their businesses.147 It is suggested that
herein lies one of the major difficulties with the prohibition of pass-on theory
under circumstances which differ significantly from those which prevailed in
Illinois Brick. If neither "litigative burdens" nor the "risk of duplicative re-
covery" 1 48 are implicated in Merican, then the result in Merican has no foun-
dation in antitrust policy.'
49
By refusing to hold that the plaintiffs' damage claims were outside the
purview of Illinois Brick, the Merican court has created a loophole in the anti-
trust laws.' 50 Those who wish to monopolize or restrain trade through the
destruction of certain indirect purchasers need not do so directly and thereby
open themselves to a possible section 4 action. 151 Instead, they can utilize
their existing distribution systems to insulate themselves from damages.'
52
Id at 969. It is submitted that this narrow "pass-on" analysis is irrelevant to the
plaintiffs' claim that the defendant's conduct was designed to destroy the plaintiffs'
businesses. For a discussion of the Dart Drug court's analysis of similar claims, see
notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
146. The direct purchaser, an authorized dealer of the defendant, did not pur-
sue any antitrust claims against Caterpillar. 713 F.2d at 968-69. In light of this fact,
it is further suggested that the Merican case did not present the type of complex dam-
age issues which the Ilhoi Brick court feared. The Supreme Court argued that
"[plermitting the use of pass-on theory under § 4. . .would add whole new dimen-
sions of complexity to treble-damage suits and seriously undermine their effective-
ness." llhnois Brik, 431 U.S. at 737. Although the damage issues in Merican may be
complicated, they are based on claims of discriminatory conduct, not pass-on theory.
147. See Merican, 713 F.2d at 971 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("This is not a
case where passed-on overcharges are so splintered that no indirect purchaser will be
interested in pursuing relief; here, plaintiffs allege predatory destruction of their busi-
ness-a complaint which only they may bring.").
148. The duplicative recovery rationale was based on sympathy for the defend-
ant rather than advancement of the goal of antitrust law enforcement. See lllinois
Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-32. Some commentators had argued that it was better to ac-
cept the risk of multiple liability rather than permit injured parties to go uncompen-
sated. See Comment, supra note 40, at 411. The Supreme Court specifically rejected
this argument. See Ilhnois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731 n. 1l. The Court noted that "al-
lowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of multi-
ple liabilityfor defendants." Id. at 730 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Illinois
Brick Court's analysis of the multiple liability concern, see note 46 and accompanying
text supra.
149. For a discussion of the applicability of the "litigative burden" analysis of
Illinois Brick to Merican, see notes 47 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
150. See Merican, 713 F.2d at 971 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("The anti-com-
petitive conduct plaintiffs complain of cannot otherwise be policed.").
151. Monopolization and attempts to monopolize are proscribed by § 2 of the
Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Restraints of trade are proscribed by § I of
the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). For the relevant text of§ 1, see note 19
supra. For the pertinent text of § 2, see note 68 supra.
152. Of course, this result is predicated upon the assumption that the defend-
ant's conduct does not fall within the "ownership or control" exception to llhnois
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Such a result is neither consistent with the goals of sound antitrust policy nor
required by the Ili'nois Brick decision.
Gregoyj Boles
Brick. This exception is discussed at notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra. How-
ever, the Third Circuit has placed a high burden on plaintiffs who wish to demon-
strate the applicability of this exception. See Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 589 (antitrust
violator must dominate and control subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary is
deemed to be an agent for the parent before the ownership or control exception is
applicable). It follows from the Mid- West decision that the Merican plaintiff might not
have recovered even fits seller was a subsidiary of the defendant, provided the "domi-
nation" element was not present. See id.
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